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In considering the future of budding Middle Eastern democracies, past
experience and scholarship show that a possible outcome for even the most
“successful” ones is some form of imperfect democracy. Based within the
literature on democratic transitions and hybrid regimes, this article explores
possible factors leading to such outcomes. It focuses in particular on reform/
security dilemmas, and the resulting evolution of dual state structures, in
which an unelected and often authoritarian state establishment coexists with
democratic institutions and practices, for example, in countries like Russia,
Iran, or Pakistan. Much of the literature views such duality as an impasse, and
thus considers these countries as trapped within this “hybridness” –
discouraging news both for currently deﬁned “hybrid regimes” and for
countries like Egypt and Tunisia, which are now launching democratization
processes. To better understand the nature and evolution of such regimes, this
article looks at the case of Turkey, ﬁrst tracing the rise and consolidation of the
Turkish inner state, generally equated with the Turkish armed forces. It then
looks at the apparent diminishing and integration of the inner state through
pacts and coalitions among both civilian and military elements, and calls into
question whether the pessimistic view of permanent illiberalness is inevitable.
Keywords: reform security; Turkey; democratization; transitions; hybrid
regimes; Middle East
Introduction
The ongoing revolutions in the Middle East have resparked debate over the com-
patibility of Islam and democracy. As a contender for the position of a “model”
democracy in the Muslim world, Turkey, despite its problems, has held the lead
for several years. The Islamist Justice and Development (AK) party is seen by
many as an example of a successful merging of Islam and democratic practice,
leading to its labelling as a model by past and present Western leaders,1 as well
as by the popular media and in scholarly literature. These accounts have ranged
from positive descriptions of Turkey’s exemplifying potential2 to the more cau-
tious3; with others arguing that Turkey’s unique history, geographical location,
and culture reduce the feasibility of such a role.4 Nevertheless, public opinion of
# 2013 Taylor & Francis
∗Email: ersel@bilkent.edu.tr
Democratization, 2013
Vol. 20, No. 6, 1144–1164, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.811194
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ilk
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
0:1
7 0
7 M
ay
 20
14
 
Turkey as a model remains popular, most recently among those caught up in the
movements of the “Arab Spring”.5
The idea of serving as a model can be considered at two levels: providing an
“end result” example of what a Middle Eastern democracy might look like; and
providing an example of the process by which a country might achieve a transition
from a non-democratic, authoritarian regime to a democratic one. While the end
result picture is welcomed by publics hungry for optimistic news – it worked
there, it can work here – it is actually the process which is obviously of greater
importance. Perhaps the only thing that is clear about the future of transitioning
countries like Egypt or Tunisia is that they are embarking on a long journey, the
stages of which will inevitably include ups and downs. What types of setbacks
and stumbling blocks might they face and what might their sources be? Will set-
backs necessarily mean the failure of a transition process? While recognizing the
uniqueness of every country’s individual history, leadership, context, and
culture, a look at the example of Turkey, not only in its current “end result” but
in the very tumultuous process via which it reached its current stage of political lib-
eralization, can perhaps provide some insights for countries embarking on their
own transition processes and help lead to recommendations for overcoming the
reform/security dilemma in the long run.
The reform/security dilemma
As acknowledged above, transitions from authoritarian regimes to democratic ones
do not occur overnight, nor is the process always a linear one. Democratic tran-
sitions almost certainly face challenges, sometimes resulting in outright reversals,
or perhaps culminating in something that does not exactly resemble a liberal
democracy. Thus we see many countries around the world appearing to stagnate
at a point between authoritarianism and democracy,6 and the literature is replete
with reports on the persistence of so-called hybrid regimes,7 semi-democracies,8
illiberal democracies,9 imitation democracies,10 pseudo-democracies,11 electoral
democracies,12 praetorian states,13 military democracies,14 sovereign democra-
cies,15 or the all-encompassing democracies with adjectives.16 Underlying all of
these terms is the understanding that the existing “democracy” is somehow
limited; it has been unable to transform into a fully consolidated liberal democracy.
This limitation may range from cases of countries in which there are elections held
but no true sense of civil liberties, to countries that have advanced signiﬁcantly
along the path of democratization and liberalization but still maintain some
degree of unaccountable authoritarian power source in their governance, for
example, a powerful monarch or a military that is not entirely under civilian
control. Regardless of the individual details, such countries all seem to reside in
the political “gray zone” exemplifying the “end-of-the-transition-paradigm”
argument.17
A common thread among these cases, and an issue that will almost certainly be
relevant for transitioning Middle Eastern countries, is often the idea that the cause
Democratization 1145
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for this limited democracy is a rationale of needing to maintain security. Whether
due to existing security challenges or to fears that emerge directly from the political
opening-up process itself, not only the leading elites but even the societies of these
countries may adopt an understanding that a safety belt or guarantor for the liberal-
ization process is necessary.18 Therein lies a dilemma: such a safety belt must be a
security providing mechanism, and therefore must include strong security institu-
tionalization – a process that is almost inevitably illiberal in nature, since it rep-
resents a type of authoritative, centralization of power at a time when political
decentralization is meant to be on the rise.
While the transitions literature obviously carries the basic understanding that
successful transitions mean the removal of the authoritarian regime, it also
includes the idea of pacts, which allows for the possibility of a role for at least
some part of the authoritarian power in the democratization process – a crucial
point when considering the regime/security dilemma, and the arguable need for
a guarantor in the process. Indeed, one of the basic tenets of the transition literature
is that a primary causal variable during transitions is elite bargaining, and in par-
ticular, the strategic interaction between leaders of the former regime and represen-
tatives of the opposition forces. Basically, O’Donnell and Schmitter wrote that
authoritarian regimes may be willing to enter into a power-sharing agreement or
pact with opposition forces when key elements of the ruling apparatus decide
that the status quo is unsustainable and that the regime is going to require some
form of “electoral legitimation”.19 The key to a successful move for transition is
linked to divisions in the authoritarian regime itself, generally between hardliners
and softliners in the military. The argument runs that in the face of public protests
against the authoritarian leadership, hardliners argue that the crisis does not
warrant the risks of liberalization, while softliners fear that barring the granting
of some liberal rights/electoral liberalization, they will be removed from power.
It is these softliners who may become part of a “dissenting alliance” in support
of transition – the implied magnanimity of which has been questioned, though
not the resulting pacts themselves.20
Given the evidence from democratization processes in recent decades however,
the key question with respect to pacts may be whether so-called “pacted tran-
sitions” are just another way of explaining the evolution of stagnant limited democ-
racies and hybrid regimes. Even a leading transitions scholar, reﬂecting on the past
quarter-century of scholarship and experience, has noted that there may be a ten-
dency for pacted transitions to “lock in” existing privileges for people.21
On the other hand, some recent works have questioned the idea that democra-
tization should immediately aim at fully eradicating or even greatly weakening the
existing authoritarian powers. In Asia, a comparison of the progress of democra-
tization in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia suggests that a more controlled and
secure – but less democratic – transition process in Singapore has bred a context
in which liberal democratic values are now slowly taking hold,22 and from the side
of democracy promotion, some cautious recognition has been given to the poten-
tial of “liberal authoritarian” responses.23 In Africa, although elections alone have
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been rightly questioned as an accurate measure of democratization,24 a quantitat-
ive study of democratizing countries has still gone against the stagnation argument
by showing that the more times elections are held, even if interspersed by periods
of reversal to authoritarianism, the lower the chances become for future military
intervention,25 and a comparative case study has presented the idea that a democ-
racy with authoritarian roots can be successful.26 In the Middle East, it has been
argued that democratization through pacts with the power-holding elites is the
best way to guarantee gradual acceptance of liberal democratic values.27
Which brings us to the crux of the reform/security dilemma: Will guarantors of
security inevitably remain as constant blockages to a full liberalization process? In
other words, does the reform/security dilemma necessarily represent an impasse?
One way of exploring such questions is to consider the case of Turkey, a country
that has long been exposed to the dilemma of balancing demands for both liberal
reform and security,28 and which, despite common references to it as a model, has
with even greater frequency been viewed as an example of an imperfect, limited
democracy. After more than 50 years of multiparty politics and the transformations
it has made in order to meet European Union (EU) membership accession criteria,
Turkey has had trouble shaking the image that it is run by the not-so-invisible
Turkish army – an unaccountable, “inner-state” structure. This idea is evident
both in the literature29 and in popular belief internationally.30 In recent years,
however, the country seems to be witnessing some success in moving beyond
the reform/security dilemma, suggesting the need to look more carefully at the
longitudinal process of this country’s democratic transition. Because of
Turkey’s long history of struggling with the dilemma of reconciling reform and
security, its experience can provide more than just a snapshot of such an inner
state structure; it allows for a look at its rises and declines, its potentially evolving
functions, and changes in its relations with the society and civilian leaders.
The following sections explore the role of Turkey’s inner state in the country’s
democratization process by asking: What exactly is the inner state in Turkey and
why did it come to exist? What role has Turkey’s inner state played in the country’s
overall political liberalization process? Finally, what can a longitudinal look at the
decades of interplay between the Turkish inner state and the forces of democratic
transformation teach us about today’s democracies with adjectives, the possible
futures of the newly transforming countries of the “Arab Spring”, and about the
potential for overcoming the reform/security dilemma? The following sections
explore these questions by tracing the Turkish experience throughout the twentieth
and early twenty-ﬁrst centuries, from the earliest efforts for liberalization through
to the current day.
Understanding Turkey’s inner state
In looking at the various entities that have at times been reportedly connected with
or determined to constitute Turkey’s “inner” or “deep state”, a common bond
among them tends to be their intent on maintaining the status quo of the overall
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existing governance structure. The justiﬁcation for their existence is generally that
the politically elected government has lost control, and if efforts outside of regular
governmental practice are not made, the whole state together with the nation will
collapse. These alternative power sources claim therefore to be seeking to secure
the state’s continuity in the face of revolutionary political experiments gone out
of control. Institutionally, the Turkish inner state can be equated with the
Turkish army. However, since the backdrop of the inner state is based on a
broad ideological and psychological sentiment of fear of collapse, “inner state-
hood” extends well beyond the army, into parts of the state bureaucracy and
even into the society itself. It includes a variety of actors, large (for example, the
secular judiciary) and small (for example, individual newspaper columnists), legit-
imate (for example, the National Security Council) or not (for example, groups
such as the Kuvvacılar31), those particularly organized for this vanguard mission
to those just offering their services and support on an ad hoc basis.
In this article, the term “inner state” is used when referring to this broader
“coalition” and ideological convergence. The military is named directly when
referring to that institution in particular.
Still unanswered, however, is the question of whether this inner state and in par-
ticular its core of the Turkish military is a static entity, an indication of a ﬁrmly
entrenched imperfect democracy, or whether it can change – or be changed –
over time to gradually and safely allow the overall Turkish governance system to
become a truly liberal democratic one. Leading scholarship on the overall
Turkish state structure has generally held the conviction that because of a continu-
ous strong internal security threat perception and resulting securitization process
(with its openness to an over-prioritization of national security), the Turkish mili-
tary maintains its position as an autonomous and isolated part of a therefore rela-
tively static Turkish state,32 and even recent works on the Turkish military are
often disinclined to see genuine change in the military’s autonomous position.33
Once having been identiﬁed as such, there naturally remained little incentive to
delve further into this static inner state structure.34 Moreover, since access to the
“black box” of the inner state was also very restricted, research on the subject
was further stalled. Most scholars turned their attention instead to the more
dynamic, open, and relatively newer components of Turkish politics, such as demo-
cratic parties and civil society.35 These areas of research naturally took on greater
importance as issues such as the Kurdish question or the political Islamist challenge
took hold in Turkish politics, resulting in still further abandonment of inquiry into
the “already resolved” concept of the Turkish inner state establishment.
It is arguable, however, that when we look holistically and longitudinally at the
Turkish state and its evolution, the static appearance is rather a reﬂection of a par-
ticular structural balance between the main forces shaping up Turkish statehood,
namely the respective forces of security and reform demands and their correspond-
ing manifestation in the duality of inner state and government. What appears as
static therefore, may be a reﬂection of Turkey’s historical need to ﬁnd a working
balance between these demands, and thus to insure a relatively safe transformation
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process. If the primary internal process in Turkish governance is a dynamic balan-
cing between reform and security, a tilt towards one direction, even a long-lasting
one, does not mean that it can never change. Such a balancing nature also means
that once one of the forces is signiﬁcantly altered, so will be the nature of Turkish
statehood.
An overview of the Turkish case seems to reveal that even when political refor-
mation and modernization were accepted by the broad leading elite as a primary
goal, the parties involved (various societal elites, the military, and, later on, poli-
ticians) did not necessarily have the same understanding and expectation of the
outcome or the process of this transformation. For some it might have meant
true liberal political reform, for others it might have meant modernization andWes-
ternization. Nevertheless, throughout the process, an overall “pulling and hauling”
between proponents of these differing agendas and methods produced a peculiar
pattern of illiberal democratization for secure reform. This outcome is independent
from the original intentions of all the parties involved, but reveals the evolved form
of their combined minimum conditions. Throughout the interactive process the
Turkish military has had to accept that they can not hold on to power indeﬁnitely
and they can not rule the country from behind the scenes, while the political elite
have learned that their power is not limitless and they cannot use democracy to take
the country in whatever direction they want – particularly if it contradicts the orig-
inal principles of the Republic’s foundation. Finally, the society has learned that at
the end it is a democracy that they want, but not at the risk of overall collapse, and
therefore they must resist all kinds of radicalism.
Origins of a security/reform pendulum
The roots of this balancing between reform and security go back to the strategic
choice ﬁrst made by the Ottoman elite in the nineteenth century to commit the
country to modernization.
Adaptation of an irreversible national policy of modernization became the
second major force – next to the traditional one of guaranteeing territorial security
– of Turkish politicalmodus vivendi. There were three early characteristics of inter-
action between these two forces.
First, at a time when the Ottoman Empire was in a state of constant territorial
contraction, the elite who were in favour of liberal reforms justiﬁed their liberaliza-
tion agenda by claiming it would better protect the state from various security
threats. Security, in other words, was seen as the end while modernization was
the means. Second, there was at the time (and arguably continues to exist) a fear
among the elite of uncontrolled devolution of power. This security-based cautious-
ness towards political liberalization as a part of modernization was often connected
to a concern that liberalization and political reform would empower ordinary citi-
zens, of whom the elite held an inherent mistrust. Third, the very ruling elite that
assumed the mission of promoting liberalizing reforms was, ironically, the same
group whose primary responsibility it was to protect the country’s national security.
Democratization 1149
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At times of immediate threat, when the two elements clashed, the elite’s role as the
professional security guardian of the state and the regime prevailed, therefore spel-
ling at least a temporary end to liberalization.
These three characteristics were the starting points in the emergence of a struc-
tural pendulum between security and liberalization in the Turkish state. Looking at
a model of Turkey’s state transformation in response to the prime directive of bal-
ancing between these two (see Figure 1), this pendulum stage is represented by
ﬁgures A and B exerting pressure on the Turkish state. For the most part, the secur-
ity of the state enjoyed a clear primacy over the liberalization side of the pendulum,
resulting in a kind of “reserved” westernization that often contradicted fundamen-
tally with the liberalizing ideals.
While the early part of the twentieth century was marked by much warfare, the
mid-1920s saw a return to relative peace, and an increasing push among some in
the ruling elite for further liberalization. Most notable of their efforts were two
early attempts to introduce multiparty politics. In the face of internal security
issues however, such as Kurdish rebellions in the east and the rise of violent oppo-
sition to the secular reforms,36 the more security-minded elite opposed the efforts,
arguing that excessive democratic reforms would endanger the regime and the very
state itself. Throughout the subsequent securitization process, the attempts for mul-
tiparty politics failed. If society was not yet ready to be trusted with democracy,
desires for world-standard democratic values would have to be postponed, if not
sacriﬁced, in the name of preventing anarchy and regime insecurity.
From pendulum to bifurcation: a grand compromise
Throughout the 1930s and early 1940s, the security of the regime and state held
primacy in public life, and in the continuing pendulum between security and liber-
alization. At the end of World War II however, the Turkish state elite opted once
again for multiparty politics. In an effort to materialize a deeper integration with
the West and therefore a greater sense of security, the state elite realized that a
Figure 1. The Turkish inner state model.
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fuller embracing of Western political values and identities would also be required.
By emphasizing democracy, the Turkish elite could satisfy the urge to become a
part of the “safe” West, but also help to speed up and secure its own modernization
project. The result was the establishment in 1946 and ultimate election in 1950 of
the Democratic Party.
Fear of the Democratic Party’s goal to change the unbalanced power situation
between itself and the rest of the political system, which, at the time, was a kind of
mixed, embedded body of the state and the single party elite led, ultimately, to the
1960 military coup. What followed would have long-term implications for the
maintenance of an “optimal” balance between reform and security. In the wake
of the 1960 coup, two main positions emerged among the military on how the
nation should be administered: that of the “gradualists”, who preferred a quick
return to political rule, albeit under a serious level of control by the statist elite
and the army; and that of the “absolutists”, generally the younger ofﬁcer class,
who felt that the army should stay in power in order to speed up the social and pol-
itical transformations in the country. The interesting point here was that neither the
absolutists nor the gradualists were against further political transformation, but
they differed over how quickly, sharply, and “safely” (that is, under how much
authoritarian control) that transformation would be managed. Ultimately, the abso-
lutists’ ideas were radical and threatening, both to the gradualist military leadership
and obviously to the political leaders, and served to force the rest of the politico-
military actors to come together in a consensus.
Two executions, two syndromes
With the signing of a compromise protocol in which the politicians agreed, among
other things, to support the presidency of the former coup leader, a kind of power-
sharing among the gradualist state elite was established. Multiparty politics would
be allowed to continue, but security demands would be permitted to impose certain
restrictions on the political realm when necessary. Lack of obedience to this com-
promise by the political elite was virtually unthinkable. The vivid image of the
hanged Democratic Party leaders, including the former Prime Minister Adnan
Menderes, served as a haunting reminder – a kind of Menderes Syndrome – for
what could occur if they and their actions were construed as risky and thus
served as ammunition for the absolutist elements inside the military to gain
strength. These absolutist radical elements within the military then received a
lesson of their own however, when, in 1962, a second coup attempt by absolutist
forces was quashed, and its leaders, Talat Aydemir and Fethi Gu¨rcan, were hanged.
The resulting Aydemir Syndrome would help maintain the hierarchical unity of the
military and thus reduce the fear of coup threats by renegade military elements.
Together, the two syndromes constituted the boundaries of the Turkish state’s
power structure, and the nation’s illiberal democratization process.
The compromise also marked the next stage in the progression from pendulum
to an outright bifurcation in the state system (corresponding to section E in Figure
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1). With security demands providing the legitimization for statist elements, and lib-
eralizing demands supporting the maintenance of a multiparty system, the need to
ﬁnd a manageable way to govern under these simultaneous pressures resulted in a
compromise between two realms – a “hard” realm of security-minded elements
and a political “soft” realm. The compromise also signalled acceptance of the
idea that the democratic transformation could only be effectively and safely con-
trolled by allowing the creation and consolidation of untouchable power centres,
in other words, by a strong, autonomous inner state led by the Turkish military.
Consolidation and institutionalization of reform security
Over the next two decades, corresponding to the overall insecurity of the ColdWar,
internal clashes between the left and right, secularists and Islamists, and an increas-
ingly violent Kurdish separatist movement in the south-east, the autonomy of the
hard realm would become increasingly institutionalized, from the passing of laws
giving the military strong powers over its own personnel, education, and ﬁnancial
resources, to the establishing of distinct military and civilian courts, and the intro-
duction and expansion of the National Security Council (NSC). The 1982 consti-
tution served to consolidate many of these security-based changes, and marked the
peak period in the evolution of an established bifurcation in the Turkish state struc-
ture, in which the inner state, while maintaining some interaction with the govern-
ment or “apparent” state (most dramatically through the platform of the NSC) was
now virtually autonomous from government oversight and control. This period
corresponds to section F in Figure 1.
The dual state structure reﬂected the Turkish national need to secure a gradual
reform process from the risks and threats involved with liberalization and opening
up. So long as the security demands – represented in Figure 1 by box A and by the
examples for self-justiﬁcation of the inner state (labelled “G”, with examples of the
Cold War, conﬂict with Greece and Iran, the Cyprus issue, and domestic struggles
with Kurdish separatists and Islamists) – clearly seemed to outweigh those for
reform – the ideologically appealing but less urgent demands represented by
box B and by the examples for reform self-justiﬁcation labelled “H” (Westerniza-
tion) – the Turkish “inner state model” would remain to cope with both domestic
and foreign policy.
But was that – or is that – as the stagnant democracy argument would suggest,
the end of the story? Was Turkey’s illiberal status permanent and static or would it
ever be possible to talk about a deepening of political liberalization despite such a
state structure?
Towards reform-centric transformation and the democratic integrated
state
The primacy of security began to slowly change along with Turkey’s accession
process to the EU. At ﬁrst the change was gradual, but it sped up dramatically in
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the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century, and brought with it signiﬁcant impli-
cations for Turkey’s balancing of reform and security pressures. The early years
of Turkey’s EU accession process and overall relations with the Europeans can
be described as a mutual pretense unaccompanied by substantive requirements
from either side that allowed Turkish governance to maintain a security-centric
balance. But the ever-growing demands of the liberalization process (both in
terms of domestic expectations and in terms of EU stipulations such as meeting
the Copenhagen Criteria) along with the gradual effects of established formal
mechanisms of the EU accession process, came to mean that while Turkey was
continuing to seek an “optimal balance” between two long-existing pressures,
the understanding of “optimal” required a shift towards the reform side of the
balance. Such a shift also required an evolution of the state structure to maintain
that balance, moving towards an ideal of an integrated state structure (see
Figure 2, section I) in which the inner state becomes subordinated to an overarch-
ing democratic “Turkish state”.
Interestingly, the road to the EU and the resulting need to shift towards “reform-
centric transformation” came to be seen as a strategic choice that was accepted not
only by the political and business elite. For the leaders of the inner state, this route
came to be viewed as the only possible strategy to respond to many domestic and
external problems facing the country, from chronic economic problems, the possi-
bility that Turkey might be left outside of the European security and defense struc-
ture, political Islam, and the Kurdish question. The only apparent alternative to the
EU route appeared to be to face Turkey’s problems alone, and that option clearly
held the risk of utter failure or at best regressive reversals from the country’s social,
economic, and political progress. Thus, beginning around the time of the 1999 Hel-
sinki Summit, at which Turkey’s eligibility for EU membership was certiﬁed, a
new consensus between the inner and apparent states seems to have been
reached on a commitment to the EU membership process, and with this, a need
to readjust the balance towards reform rather than security. Having said that, the
shift was not of course a black and white move from one perspective to another,
and it was not without its complications.
Figure 2. The Turkish model for reform security.
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The ﬁrst major complications were expected to emerge when the 2002 parlia-
mentary elections brought to power a government which, though broadly a conser-
vative democratic party, also carried with it openly Islamist cultural values and
overtones.37 In the past such parties had led to outright military coups as well as
indirect ones (in the case of the 28 February 1997 easing from power of the Islamist
prime minister). Surprisingly though, even under the political leadership of the
moderate Islamist AK party government, the ﬁrst several years of the consensus
passed smoothly. For several reasons the government placed its full weight
behind a reform-centric transformation, and its energies into the EU accession
process. The government knew this route would clearly show that they were sub-
scribing to mainstream politics rather than to marginal aspects of their broadly
“Islamist” party. At the same time, by allying with the foreign forces (EU) their
efforts would also strengthen them against the inner state. Even though the lack
of confrontation between the AK party government and the military leadership
of the inner state had much to do with the particular accommodative personality
and beliefs of then Chief of Staff Hilmi O¨zko¨k, the larger reason was still the
AK party’s careful building up on the existing consensus, in the sense of not
only concentrating on EU accession efforts, but also refraining from irritating
inner state concerns, for example, pressing excessively for the headscarf issue,
or for Kurdish rights.
By the start of 2006, there were some signs of the consensus shifting back
towards a more security-centric balance. If we are to look for a starting point
leading to such a shift, we might point to the EU’s less than enthusiastic reactions
to Turkey’s revolutionary reforms and the Turkish public’s increasing conviction
that EU accession efforts were hopeless – the EU was beginning to reveal its see-
mingly subjective criteria to block Turkish membership, and was never going to
accept Turkey into the union. Then, with Iraq sinking further into chaos and the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) resuming violent action in Turkey, societal fear
began to rise, and attention was turned again to society’s own faultlines – political
Islam and the possible hidden agendas of the AK party government, the separatist
movement in the south-east and its connections with the rising Kurdish state in
northern Iraq. As had been the general tendency in past decades, the degree of
national insecurity – and subsequently the securitization of daily life and politics
– became widespread, culminating with the tensions over the presidential selection
process of 2007, and the army’s website warning, or “e-coup attempt” – a sign of
the inner state reminding everyone that it remained on guard as the ultimate
response to a national fear of collapse.
Ultimately however, even that tense period amounted to nothing, and President
Gu¨l took his place in the presidential palace. When the majority AK party govern-
ment then went on to tackle that most challenging of issues – reversing the consti-
tutional law that forbids female students from wearing headscarves on university
grounds – again, the army remained quiet. Arguably, even though the army was
naturally opposed to this move, they were unwilling to “look like the bad guy”38
in the eyes of society, and were therefore waiting for the civilian legal process to
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unfold; waiting to see whether the Constitutional Court would conﬁrm parlia-
ment’s vote. Subsequent behaviour, such as the military’s failure to resist the
arrests of army ﬁgures accused of coup plotting in the ongoing Ergenekon
scandal, and a former chief of staff’s open statement to the media that the army
has a proper channel to communicate its ideas (the NSC) and should restrict
itself to that channel, are signs of self-restraint and of a reluctance to intervene
in politics.
This reluctance to intervene shows how the Turkish inner state has learned,
over years of back and forth, that military interventions into daily politics, while
producing short-term achievements of pushing back “radical” ideologies, have
ultimately led to comebacks by the “victims”. This was the case in 1965, 1983,
2002, and 2007. Perhaps because of this, while the Islamists have softened their
discourse, military interventions (not always in response only to political Islamist
concerns) have also become less direct. From a coup in which the elected leaders
were hanged (1960), to one in which the prime minister and leaders were jailed and
kicked out of politics (1980), to a post-modern coup (1997) in which a couple of
tanks and the media were used to prepare the public and the NSC was used to
force the resignation of the prime minister, to 2007, a quiet Friday night posting
to a website leading the prime minister to back away from his candidate and call
for early parliamentary elections. The Turkish inner state seems to have learned
that society could eventually turn against them if they come out too strongly
against societal values – one of which may even be democracy itself – but
more importantly there are signs that the Turkish inner state is not a completely
monolithic, isolated, and unchanging entity that has remained untouched by
years of back and forth. New thinking is now on record even within parts of
the army that the military should be kept subordinate to politics,39 and that there
is in fact a clear decrease in the weight of those who would like to preserve a
security-centric transformation and others who lean towards reform-centric
transformation.
Who controls securitization?
Which brings us once again back to the question of whether Turkey is a permanent
imperfect democracy. Has the “pulling and hauling” within the Turkish governance
system led to a consolidated reform-centric balance in which there is enough self-
conﬁdence to push aside the guarantor of the inner state once and for all? Is there
enough conﬁdence that the nation can, through politics, reign in its marginal
elements – be they religious, ethnic, or other – and safely complete the liberaliza-
tion process? For a country working through the reform/security dilemma, the ulti-
mate sign of whether the reform side has truly established its dominant position
may very well be when the leaders of the reform process, the politicians of the
apparent state, assume the management of responsibilities traditionally belonging
to the security realm – deﬁning what constitutes national threats, determining what
should be done to counter those threats, and organizing the responses to them.
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In other words, assuming a democratic control over the very securitization process
that, in such an insecure environment, traditionally allows the security sector to
take a predominant role.
There seems to be one problematic issue left in Turkey with the potential of
raising widespread societal fear, of being thus open to easy securitization, and
capable of bringing the inner state’s role once again to the forefront – which
would indicate that the inner state is indeed a permanent aspect of Turkish govern-
ance and that Turkish society is stuck in a vicious circle of illiberal democracy. This
is the Kurdish separatist question – how it should be managed and by whom. If
there is any indication at this stage of Turkey’s liberalization journey that the tra-
ditional securitization tendency of the Kurdish question by the inner state is being
blocked, reversed, or desecuritized by the soft realm of politics, then it is possible to
begin speaking of a sea change, a true shrinking of the country’s authoritarian ten-
dencies, and a breaking away from its illiberal status.
Early, cautiously optimistic signs emerged both with the 2007 and 2011 parlia-
mentary elections. Those elections suggest that a majority of the nation has decided
to trust in politics as the ultimate tool to manage even this most deeply embedded of
their divisions and fears. In the majority Kurdish populated regions of the country,
the self-deﬁned political centrist AK party government has generally been able to
win over at least as many votes as the openly pro-Kurdish candidates. At the same
time, in regions in which openly anti-Kurdish sentiment and the Turkish nationalist
Milliyetci Hareket Partisi have traditionally been strongest, again the political cen-
trist AK government consistently seems able to win the vast majority. In other
words, even in the most polarized regions of the country with respect to separatism,
a majority of the public is ready to opt for a centrist route rather than the more
radical choices on either side.
In the years between these two elections, the government seemed equally
willing to put itself on the line in order to show that politics and politicians are
capable of handling even this major security issue. When post-election PKK vio-
lence broke out in 2008 and a number of soldiers were killed, the government
resisted domestic calls for a powerful military response. True, they passed a resol-
ution in parliament giving the government authority to allow military operations
into northern Iraq, but they did not immediately call for such moves – despite
the chief of staff’s assertion that they were necessary. They instead insisted that
it was the government’s and politicians’ jobs to determine when the time was
right, and repeatedly made the argument that even though the military option
was on the table, political, economic, and diplomatic options should be prioritized.
Though some military moves were eventually employed, at the end, the govern-
ment’s efforts can be argued to have been part of the producing of a new type of
environment, one in which a traditional, military option has become just one instru-
ment of an overall political offensive against security problems. In the discussion,
the government displayed that it could act in a professional manner, cultivating the
support of opinion leaders such as the media, intellectuals, and think tanks and
showing that the soft realm has not only expanded but has within it the ﬁgures,
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institutions, and coordination capacity to take on complex security issues and
reconstruct them in a more civilian perspective.
In the lead-up to the 2011 elections, there was continued cautiously optimistic
evidence of the “politicizing” of this security issue. Among leading political party
leaders the Kurdish question has become a topic for debate, with the main opposi-
tion Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader raising the possibility of Turkey
accepting a “European standard” of autonomy. While it remains still very much
an unresolved issue, at minimum, the politicians seem to be the ones in the
driver’s seat, and seem to be trying to manage it within the democratic system. Rea-
listically though, it must be acknowledged that the continued strong presence of a
separatist/nationalist movement in the country still carries the deﬁnite potential of
substantively disrupting Turkey’s liberalization process. How Turkey turns this last
corner in its historical evolution into a liberal democracy and copes with the
Kurdish question might also carry a demonstrative impact for other Middle
Eastern states dealing with their own fragmented societal fabrics and individual
reform/security dilemmas.
Conclusion
Making the transformation to a liberal democratic state structure from an authori-
tative one is a complex task for any nation. The task becomes even more complex
when the country attempting it is subject to internal and external anarchic press-
ures. Recognizing the need to strike a proper balance between security and
reform, understanding the evolution of these two components in a manner that
allows for deﬁning that “proper” balance, and creating effective institutions and
agents to maintain a safe and secure reform process, are essential acts for such a
nation. Failure to achieve a workable reform security can provoke regressive
societal divisions and fears, and progressive instincts for reformwill likely be sacri-
ﬁced to those fears. Societies which feel they are risking their very existence will
not be willing to proceed into uncharted and turbulent practices of liberalization,
and societies that do not have the chance to practice and experience liberal
values will have a very difﬁcult time becoming full liberal democracies.
What insights can the Turkish case have for other countries seeking secure
regime reform or for countries deciding whether or how to pursue policies of
democracy promotion around the world? The overall Turkish case, not the
Turkey of 1960, or 1980, or even 1997, but Turkey’s more than 50 years of
dynamic illiberal democratization, shows that a gradual retreat of the inner state
is possible, and that the reform/security dilemma need not conclude in an either/
or endpoint. This is shown in the evidence of civilian politicians beginning to
gain control over the securitization process, and this is shown in the inability
and perhaps even unwillingness of the authoritarian power centres to prevent
them from doing so. Throughout the give-and-take learning process that has
characterized Turkey’s political liberalization, the Turkish inner state has itself
had to become accountable, perhaps not on paper, but in terms of its legitimacy
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in societal opinion. The core of the inner state, the Turkish army, has learned that
without societal support, they lose status, prestige, and legitimacy, and thus it
would be prudent to consider societal opinion before making a move into the gov-
ernance realm. This exempliﬁes an acceptance, however grudging, of a liberal
value – accountability – at the core of an illiberal power centre.
What does this mean for modern sceptics of the transition paradigm, or for
those who would shy away from ever supporting non-democratic forces while
trying to promote democracy? It shows us that in countries facing both security
concerns and a need to still transform into liberal democracies, a collective
demand for a safe and stable transformation might very well lead to the formation
of inner statehoods. The desire for stable transformations leads to Russian society’s
support of Vladimir Putin’s hardline politics after an era of Yeltsin’s uncontrolled
and chaotic liberalization, and can also help explain signiﬁcant Iranian public
support for politicians like Ahmadinejad after an unstable period of reformist poli-
tics. It also may explain the powerful role of the intelligence bureaucracy (ISI) in
Pakistan, and that of the Turkish military. None of these examples is accidental; all
reﬂect an underlying dynamic of competing pressures for reform and security.
Naturally though, the question arises: how do you prevent the supposed guar-
antor from succumbing to its presumable natural tendencies and preying on the
reform itself in the name of security? Three things seem to be essential, at the insti-
tutional, national, and international levels. First, at the institutional level, some
degree of autonomy of the security projector may be acceptable, as long as the
institution’s underlying philosophy contains basic beliefs for modernity and pro-
gress – even if these remain only a long-term goal. Overt goals of democratization
for such institutions may be unrealistic, but modernization at least is essential. It
will be difﬁcult for those who have been indoctrinated in such a modernizing phil-
osophy to fully deny at least some degree of democratic practices.
Second, at the national level, the successful guarantor must be capable of legiti-
mately projecting a sense of safety to a majority of the actors of the transformation,
for example, all segments of the society, the business and bureaucratic elite. To
manage this, the security projector must not be exclusively attached to any one eth-
nicity, ideology, or class. In the Turkish case for example, the Turkish military has
not been openly dominated by any one group, and has drawn from most segments
of society without overt discrimination. Ironically, the autonomy that has justiﬁ-
ably made the military a target of criticism has also helped it remain relatively
unpenetrated by societal faultlines, ideological divisions, mass movements, and
so on. This, in turn, has facilitated its high-ranking national popularity and
image, and allowed it to provide the necessary image of broad security projector.
Finally, this guarantor must not be cut off from the international community.
Indeed, whether of its own volition or with the encouragement of outside forces,
its links with the outside world must be strengthened and institutionalized, in
order to keep the guarantor progressive and exposed to broader liberal ideas and
practices. Since the guarantor is generally a security force of some kind, such
links may include arranging international trainings or exercises, encouraging
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membership in international institutions or organizations, sponsoring exchanges of
personnel, and so on. Linked to this idea of building channels, the guarantor must
not be dismissed as a player in the transformation and reform process, but rather
brought into and made a part of it.
When it comes to so-called democracies with adjectives and those countries of
the “Arab Spring” that may one day be given this label, Turkey reminds us that lib-
eralization is a dynamic process, and that evidence of authoritarian persistence
does not necessarily rule out the possibility of democratic change – even for adopt-
ing liberal democratic values – if those authoritarian tendencies are allowing some
kind of repeated practice of democratic principles. Being liberal is not limited to
those born into it or those who quickly adopt it. Liberalness can also be the
result of a constructed process of hard work and practice, throughout which both
authoritarian ﬁgures and politicians gradually learn to postpone shortsighted inter-
ests (for example, quick popularity) for long-term ones. Learning to be liberal
requires practice, a chance for all sides to reposition themselves over time, to
come to tolerate others’ positions, and ultimately to meet at a liberal endpoint.
In many cases, the key to success may be to ﬁnd a mechanism that can comfort
all sides’ basic fears, allow a chance for repeated practice, to allow time to learn
to become liberal. Turkey is not an exception in terms of its apparent success in
overcoming the reform/security dilemma, it has just been working at it much
longer than most countries. Turks have been learning under difﬁcult conditions,
suggesting that every country may have a viable chance. Today’s countries in tran-
sition, even those in which authoritarian elements linger, also have a chance to
become liberal governance systems some day, and for now it would be unfair to
look at the nature of their current stage of transformation and brand them with
eternal illiberalness.
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